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iExecutive Summary
Wildfire and population growth are 
on a collision course in the Sierra
New research by Sierra Nevada Alliance finds that 
large numbers of people are moving to very high fire 
hazard areas of the Sierra, leading to more wildfires, 
more taxpayer expense, and more loss of life.  
In the next 20-40 years, even more people and homes 
will be in harm’s way.  The population of the Sierra is 
expected to triple by the year 2040, and new research 
by Sierra Nevada Alliance finds that 94% of the land 
slated for rural residential development is classified 
as very high or extreme fire hazard by the California 
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (also 
known as CDF or CalFire).
At the same time, climate change is already making 
summers in the Sierra hotter and drier, leading to an 
increase in the frequency and severity of catastrophic 
wildfire (Westerling, 2006).
The combination of population growth and climate 
change in our fire-prone region is creating a “perfect 
firestorm” where increasing numbers of people and 
homes will be at greater risk of catastrophic wildfire.
This report examines the relationship between land 
use planning and wildfire prevention in the Sierra.  
We hope this report will help the public, decision 
makers and conservation leaders assess where and 
how we grow, to make better choices that will keep 
our homes and communities safer.
Local governments in the Sierra, along with state 
and federal agencies, must take action to limit the 
spread of residential development into dangerous 
areas.  We must also end subsidies that encourage 
reckless development at taxpayer expense.
Fire is natural & unavoidable in the Sierra 
The Sierra Nevada is a fire-dependent landscape. 
California’s Mediterranean climate of wet winters 
and hot, dry summers creates the exact conditions 
for fire to flourish. Sierra plants, animals and 
forests evolved with fire for thousands of years, 
and have adapted to not only survive with fire, 
but to depend upon it.  The health of the Sierra 
landscape depends upon frequent, low-intensity 
fires that thin crowded forests, recycle nutrients, 
and increase biodiversity (Barbour, 1993).
New Findings of This Report:
Between 1990 and 2000, the number of people 
living in very high or extreme fire threat areas of 
the Sierra grew by 16%.
94% of the land slated for rural residential devel-
opment in the Sierra is classified by CalFire as 
very high or extreme fire threat. 
Between 1990 and 2000, the Sierra’s wildland 
urban interface (or WUI) grew by 131,000 acres, 
a 12% increase.
Better community planning can help reduce the 
number of lives and homes at risk.
•
•
•
•
The Sierra’s population is growing -- and so is the risk of 
catastrophic wildfire.  Photo by Maria Mircheva.
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Decades of fire suppression and logging 
have created a tinderbox
After the gold rush, fire suppression became the 
standard practice, and these small, low-intensity fires 
were regularly put out.  This seemingly good idea has 
had disastrous consequences.  After 100 years of fire 
suppression and logging large, fire-resistant trees, Sierra 
forests have become virtual tinderboxes, crowded 
with dead brush and small trees.  (Barbour, 1993). The 
continuing conversion of mature, fire-resistant forests 
to plantations and other industrial logging practices 
are compounding the fire threats in the Sierra Nevada, 
taking what was a fire-adapted forest system and 
making it much more vulnerable to catastrophic fire.  
Unlike the small, low-intensity fires that used to be the 
norm, Sierra wildfires today are much more likely to 
become catastrophic crown fires that char everything in 
their path. 
The Sierra is growing – into wildfire areas
The Sierra is the third-fastest growing region of 
California, and that growth is putting more people 
directly in the path of catastrophic wildfire.  By 2040, 
the population of the Sierra will triple to 1.5 million - 
2.4 million residents (Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project, 
1996).  New research by Sierra Nevada Alliance 
finds that 94% of the land slated for rural residential 
development is in areas classified by CalFire as very 
high or extreme fire hazard. 
Unsafe growth patterns increase fire danger
The wildland urban interface -- the area where houses 
and wildlands meet, and where catastrophic wildfires 
are likely to destroy lives and property -- is growing 
rapidly in the Sierra.  New research by Sierra Nevada 
Alliance finds that between 1990 and 2000, the 
wildland urban interface (WUI) in the Sierra grew 
by 12%.  As the size of the wildland-urban interface 
grows, so does the risk of catastrophic wildfire that 
destroys lives and property.
The WUI in the Sierra is characterized by low-density 
housing development scattered in a sea of flammable 
vegetation.  This pattern of low-density development, 
with one house every 2-80 acres, is often referred 
to as “rural ranchette” development.  Ranchette 
development in the WUI makes it more difficult and 
more costly for fire managers to prevent wildfires and 
protect homes and lives when major fires do occur.  
Climate change is increasing wildfire danger
At the same time that population growth is putting 
more people in fire hazard areas, climate change is 
already making summers in the Sierra hotter and drier, 
leading to an increase in the frequency and severity 
of catastrophic wildfire (Westerling 2006). CalFire 
predicts that these impacts will become more severe in 
coming years (CalFire 2003), leading to a “perfect fire 
storm” where increasing numbers of people and homes 
will be at greater risk of catastrophic wildfire.
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This figure depicts fire hazard on lands slated for 
rural residential development in the Sierra.
The 2007 Angora fire destroyed 242 homes near 
South Lake Tahoe. Photo by Autumn Bernstein.
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Taxpayers are subsidizing unsafe growth
Costs of fire prevention have increased exponentially 
in recent years as state and federal firefighters spend 
more time and money protecting new homes in 
wildland areas.  The vast majority of these costs are 
shouldered not by the affected homeowners, but by 
state and federal taxpayers.  A recent federal audit 
found that the US Forest Service is spending up to 
$1 billion annually to protect private homes adjacent 
to national forest land (USDA Office of Inspector 
General, 2006). CalFire’s fire protection expenditures 
increased an average of 10% per year between 1994 
and 2004, and much of that increased cost was due 
to increasing numbers of homes in wildland areas 
(California Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2005).
Current policy is failing at-risk communities 
Our current policy framework doesn’t do enough to 
minimize risks to lives, assets, watersheds, wildlife 
and ecosystem health.  In most parts of the Sierra, 
land use planning in wildfire areas focuses on site-
specific requirements such as clearing defensible 
space and building with fire-retardant materials.  Site-
specific building policies are important, but fire-safe 
planning must look at the bigger picture: planning the 
neighborhood and the community. 
“Fire-smart growth” can save lives and money
Development in high fire threat areas of the Sierra is 
inherently dangerous.  However, community design 
can play a large role in minimizing exposure and 
reducing losses.  Infill and clustered development, aka 
“fire-smart growth,” has numerous advantages over 
low-density ranchette development when it comes 
to fire safety.  These factors should be considered by 
counties, cities and developers when planning for new 
development in the Sierra.
  Poorly-planned growth is putting more homes in the path of wildfires like the 2007 Angora Fire.  Photo by Eric Winford. 
Taxpayers are subsidizing fire protection for homes in 
high fire hazard areas. Photo by Shasta Ferranto.
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Principles for planning fire-safe communities
This report recommends that planning in high fire 
threat areas should adhere to five fire-safe planning 
principles.  Implementation measures for each of these 
five principles are explored in chapter six of this report.
1.   Make new development pay its own way: 
Landowners contemplating development in high fire 
threat areas should be required to pay the full cost for 
fire protection.
2. Cluster development in and around existing 
communities: Local governments should encourage 
infill development and concentric outward growth 
while discouraging low-density sprawl and leapfrog 
development in high fire hazard areas.
3.   Don’t build in unsafe places: Even within an area 
of high fire hazard, some places are more dangerous 
than others.  New development should be curtailed in 
places that will put new or existing residents at greater 
risk.
4.  Manage the forested landscape to restore 
resiliency and reduce fire risk:  State, federal and 
local agencies should support responsible forest 
management practices that restore forest health and 
reduce the risk of catastrophic crown fire in the WUI. 
5.   Improve planning and budgeting processes 
to fully address risks: All levels of government 
involved in wildland fire prevention and protection 
need to improve planning and budgeting to prepare for 
coordinated wildfire prevention and response.  
Conclusion: Better planning is the key
The threat of catastrophic wildfire in Sierra 
communities has increased dramatically in recent years, 
and will only get worse unless local, state and federal 
agencies, in partnership with Sierra residents, NGOs 
and community groups, work together to address the 
underlying issues of poor planning and unfair subsidies 
that encourage irresponsible development.
We can build thriving communities that are safer and 
sustainable, by making an upfront investment in good 
planning that will save lives and money in the long run.  
Or we can continue with business as usual, and deal 
with the consequences every fire season to come.  The 
choice is ours.
Better planning can make our communities safer. 
Photo by CanyonFlorey.com
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1Sunday, June 24, 2007: When I saw the fi rst plumes of 
smoke rising over the ridge behind my house, I went 
inside to make a sandwich.  
It might sound crazy, but I’ve spent my entire life 
in California.  After a while, you get used to seeing 
little plumes of smoke.  You don’t panic. You listen 
for the sirens, you keep one eye on the sky, you turn 
on the news, but you don’t panic.  Most of the time, 
these little fi res are put out before they can become 
destructive.  Most of the time, but not this time.
While I was in the kitchen slicing cheese and toasting 
bread, I felt a great gust of wind shuddering across the 
side of the house.  I walked back outside and saw that 
the little plume of grey smoke had suddenly become 
a billowing orange column, arcing over my house and 
blocking out the sun.  The wind blew again – it was 
coming my way, fast and hot.
I never got to eat that sandwich.  My stomach was 
still growling as I drove down the road with my pets, 
laptop, sleeping bag, and a copy of East of Eden I’d 
bought at a garage sale that morning.  As I drove, 
I thought about all the things I’d left behind, and 
wondering if they’d still be there tomorrow. Six days 
later, when I was allowed to return home, the hunk of 
cheddar cheese was still on the counter, the bread still 
in the toaster.
I live on Angora ridge near South Lake Tahoe.  The 
fi re came to the very edge of my neighborhood, within 
¼ mile of my home.  I am one of the lucky ones. 
242 families lost their homes, and over a thousand 
experienced the same fear and suspense that I did, 
before returning to fi nd homes and possessions intact.
I’d spent the last two years researching and writing 
this report on wildfi re and rural development, only 
to have my own terrifying fi rst-hand experience with 
wildfi re just weeks before this report was scheduled to 
be released.  It brought home the lessons of this report 
in a very personal way that I couldn’t have imagined 
before.
My house was saved because of the remarkable efforts 
of the fi refi ghters that kept the fi re at the perimeter of 
our neighborhood.  It was also saved because the US 
Forest Service had recently completed fuel treatment 
in the forest directly adjacent to our neighborhood, 
helping to create a defensible space around our homes. 
And it was saved because I simply got lucky.
Fire is natural and unavoidable in the Sierra.  Equally 
natural and unavoidable are the impulses of people 
like myself, who want to make a home in this beautiful 
landscape.  How do we reconcile this apparent 
contradiction? 
Defensible space is one solution, and that issue has 
gotten a lot of attention in the aftermath of the Angora 
fi re.  But there is another, larger issue that has been 
largely ignored: How can we use the tools of urban 
planning to build safer communities?
While I love my home, I question whether or not my 
neighborhood should have been built in the fi rst place.  
It is an isolated, leapfrog subdivision perched atop a 
steep, fi re-prone ridge, surrounded by dense forests.  
All of these factors make it an extremely dangerous 
place in the event of a wildfi re.
New subdivisions like mine are popping up all over 
the Sierra, with little thought about the implications 
for fi re safety.  Worse still, isolated rural ranchettes are 
sprawling across the landscape, putting people in even 
more remote, hazardous areas.  This pattern of ‘rural 
sprawl’ increases the likelihood that more homes will 
be destroyed and more lives will be lost as wildfi re 
makes its inevitable march across the landscape.  
2007 is shaping up to be one of the worst fi re seasons 
in recent memory.  It is also the year that I stopped 
being a fi re observer, and became a fi re survivor.  It is 
an experience I hope never to repeat.  But unless we 
Sierrans start asking hard questions about where and 
how we grow, I fear that many more of us will have 
our own survivor stories to tell, and they won’t all 
have happy endings.
Foreword:
Lessons from the Angora Fire
by Autumn Bernstein, Land Use Coordinator
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The Sierra Nevada region
The Sierra Nevada is a 400-mile region 
characterized by tall granite peaks, 
coniferous forests and rolling, oak- and 
chaparral-covered foothills.  It includes 
portions of 22 California counties and is 
home to approximately 600,000 people.  
The Sierra is also home to over half 
the plant and animal populations of the 
state, and provides 60% of California’s 
drinking water.
The forest that John Muir saw 
Fire is an integral part of the Sierran 
landscape.  Before the arrival of 
Europeans, low-intensity ground 
fi res were commonplace and rarely 
catastrophic. Several studies have 
shown that prior to 1875, fi res occurred 
every 8-15 years in pine forests, and every 
16-30 in wetter fi r forests (Barbour, 1993).
When fi re was commonplace in the Sierra, our forests, 
woodlands and chaparral areas looked quite different 
than they do today.  The forests were more open and 
park-like, with big, mature trees and carpets of grass 
and wildfl owers, and much less woody brush and 
fewer small trees than we see today.
John Muir described the forests of the Sierra as:
“[among] the grandest and most beautiful in the 
world. . . The giant pines, and fi rs, and Sequoias 
hold their arms open to the sunlight, rising above 
one another on the mountain benches. . . The inviting 
openness of the Sierra woods is one of their most 
distinguishing characteristics.  The trees of all the 
species stand more or less apart in groves, or in 
small irregular groups, enabling one to fi nd a way 
nearly everywhere, along sunny colonnades and 
through openings that have a smooth, park-like 
surface,” (Barbour ibid).
This open, park-like setting was due largely to the 
benefi cial infl uence of fi re. It is hard to imagine today, 
when wildfi res frequently char everything in their 
path, but fi res used to be far less destructive and were 
in most cases benefi cial.  The frequent ground fi res 
cleared away brush and smaller trees, but left the 
larger trees intact.  Fire also cleared away the layer of 
dead leaves, pine needles and brush that covered the 
ground, leaving behind bare soil and stimulating the 
regeneration of grasses, wildfl owers and other small 
plants that might otherwise be unable to grow.
Because fi res came through frequently, brush and dead 
wood were eliminated before they could accumulate 
to dangerous levels.  When brush piles up and small 
trees clutter the forest, they form a “ladder” which 
allows fi re to climb from the ground into the treetops, 
resulting in catastrophic crown fi res that kill the large 
trees and threaten homes and lives.  In the Sierra 
before European arrival, such fi res were less common 
than they are today and large, old trees survived 
dozens or even hundreds of fi res (Barbour, ibid).
The Giant sequoia and fi re
In some cases, fi re also has a more specialized role in 
ensuring the health of Sierra ecosystems and even the 
survival of species. One example is the Giant sequoia, 
Chapter 1
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Low-intensity ground fi res were common in the Sierra before 1850. 
Photo by Zeke Lunder.
3which is the world’s most massive living organism 
and is found nowhere else in the world outside the 
Sierra. With its huge size and majestic stature it is 
hard to imagine that the Giant sequoia is actually quite 
vulnerable.
But its lifecycle is intimately dependent upon fi re.  
Giant sequoias produce huge amounts of cones, but 
unlike the cones of most conifers, these cones do not 
automatically open and release their seeds.  Instead, 
the cones remain green, hanging onto the parent tree 
and holding their seeds for as long as twenty years.  
Hot air from a ground fi re causes the cones to open 
and rain seeds upon the forest fl oor – up to 8 million 
seeds per acre fall after a fi re (Harvey, 1980).
Survival and successful germination of Giant sequoia 
seeds also depends upon fi re.  The seeds have a hard 
time germinating and growing to maturity in the litter 
of needles and leaves which usually covers the forest 
fl oor.  When fi re has exposed the bare soil and reduced 
the amount of shade in the forest, then the seeds can 
germinate and grow successfully.  
Land managers who steward Giant sequoia groves 
now understand the importance of fi re and use 
controlled burns to ensure the long-term survival of 
the species.  Since the reintroduction of fi re into Kings 
Canyon National Park, the number of seedlings per 
acre has grown from virtually zero to 22,000 (Harvey 
ibid).
Native Californians and fi re
For as long as there have been people in the Sierra, 
there has been management of fi re. The Sierra Nevada 
has been inhabited for at least 10,000 years by peoples 
of the Miwok, Paiute, Washo, Maidu, Yokuts, Nisenan, 
Konkow and Mono cultures, and virtually all of these 
tribal groups actively managed the landscape until the 
arrival of Europeans.  They used a variety of tools and 
techniques, but the tool that was most widely used, 
and had the most dramatic effect on the appearance 
and ecology of the Sierra, was fi re.  Indeed, it now 
appears that Native Americans used fi re to manage 
forest throughout the New World (Mann, 2006).
Foothill areas were routinely burned to reduce 
brush and stimulate the production of herbaceous 
plants and tubers, which were important to the diet 
of Native Californians, both because people ate the 
plants directly, and because they provided food for 
deer, elk and other game.  Fire also helped maintain 
the productivity of oak woodlands, important for 
the acorns they provided, and stimulated the growth 
of shrub shoots, used for basketry, buildings and, in 
the case of fruit-producing shrubs like chokecherry 
and manzanita, food.  Burning was also important 
to Native Californians because it reduced the risk of 
catastrophic crown fi res that destroyed homes and 
food-producing trees, and eliminated habitat for game 
and fi sh. According to UC Davis ethnobotanist M. Kat 
Anderson, “burning to keep the brush down” was a 
maxim adhered to by all Sierran peoples (Anderson, 
1996) .
The impacts of regular and widespread burning by 
Native Americans were signifi cant.  Approximately 
100,000 Native Americans lived in the Sierra Nevada 
before the arrival of Europeans, and virtually every 
tribal group regularly burned large areas.  While 
it is impossible to know how many fi res were 
historically caused by lightning and how many by 
Native Americans, it is likely that both natural fi res 
and human-caused fi res played an important role in 
shaping the Sierra.  What is clear is that the open, 
park-like forest which so enchanted John Muir and 
other early settlers was not a pristine wilderness, but a 
landscape that was managed by those who inhabited it 
for thousands of years (Anderson, 1996).
Changing regimes: 
fi re suppression and logging
As Europeans moved in and replaced Native 
Americans as California’s land managers, the fi re 
regime in the Sierra changed dramatically.  It became 
the norm to extinguish fi res caused by lightning or 
other natural causes and deliberate human-caused fi res 
were seen as a menace rather than as a management 
tool.  Fire suppression became the offi cial policy 
of the Forest Service in 1905 and the California 
Department of Forestry followed suit in 1924. 
In addition, the widespread industrial logging which 
began during the mining era has also changed 
the composition of Sierra forests.  The practice 
of clearcutting replaced diverse forests with vast 
plantations of small trees that are all the same age.  
Most of the Sierra’s national forests and private 
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forestlands were clearcut regularly for decades. Today, 
clearcutting continues on a large scale on some private 
forestlands.  The Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project 
(SNEP) characterized the effect of logging in this way: 
“Timber harvest, through its effects on forest 
structure, local microclimate, and fuel accumulation, 
has increased fi re severity more than any other 
recent human activity.” (SNEP, 1996).
The results of a century of fi re suppression and 
logging large, fi re-resistant trees have been dramatic.  
Sierra forests and woodlands today are more crowded 
and shrubbier.  Shade-tolerant trees such as the 
white fi r have thrived under these conditions and 
vastly expanded their numbers and range, while fi re-
dependent species such as the Giant sequoia have 
suffered (Barbour, ibid).  High meadows have been 
invaded by thickets of conifers (Taylor, 1990), and 
oak woodlands have been overtaken by deerbrush 
(Barbour, ibid). 
In these conditions, the likelihood of catastrophic 
crown fi re has increased dramatically.  Dense stands of 
young, small trees are very fl ammable.  Accumulated 
brush and dead wood are also highly fl ammable.  
Taken together, small trees, brush and dead wood form 
a “ladder” that allows fi re to climb from the ground 
into the canopy and spread quickly from tree to tree.  
This type of fi re is diffi cult to control.
Fire suppression has changed the behavior of fi res, 
but the effects vary by forest type. For example, high 
elevation red fi r forests historically experienced fairly 
long intervals between fi res, so the recent departure 
from the natural fi re regime has been less pronounced 
in these forests.  By contrast, fi res were historically 
far more frequent in lower-elevation ponderosa pine 
forests, so the effects of fi re suppression in this forest 
type have been more pronounced.
Beyond fi re suppression: 
new methods for fi re management
In recent years, fi re and land managers in the Sierra 
and throughout the West have become aware of the 
unintended consequences of fi re suppression and 
logging, and they are taking proactive 
steps to undo the damage of a century’s 
worth of mismanagement.  The removal 
of brush and small trees, in conjunction 
with prescribed burning, are techniques 
now widely used to restore forests to a 
condition similar to that which existed 
before fi re suppression.  
Making a forest more fi re safe usually 
involves cutting young trees and tall 
brush fi rst, which are then piled and 
burned safely.  Once these fuel sources 
are removed, a ground fi re is set to 
burn the remaining small brush and 
accumulated debris on the forest fl oor 
(pine needles, fallen branches, etc.).  
After the ground fi re has run its course,     
what remains are large, living trees and bare 
soil – a forest in which catastrophic crown fi re is less 
likely to occur.  The following spring, the forest fl oor 
turns green as shrubs re-sprout and annual herbs and 
wildfl owers fl ourish in the rich, newly-fertile soil.
While these new management techniques are widely 
believed to be effective at both restoring forest health 
and preventing catastrophic fi re, they are resource-
intensive, requiring large amounts of both capital 
and labor.  Over time, brush and small trees will 
accumulate once again, so effective fuel reduction 
programs require an ongoing investment of resources. 
In addition, fuel treatments are more diffi cult and 
costly to implement on steep slopes and in fragile 
areas such as stream environments.  Efforts to 
This scene from the aftermath of the 2007 Angora fi re is typical of a crown 
fi re in a dense, crowded forest.  Photo by Autumn Bernstein.
implement fuel reduction programs on a large scale 
are complicated by funding shortfalls, competing 
management priorities and the mishmash of state, 
federal and private lands.  
The continuing hazard of 
timber plantations
The conversion of forests to plantations continues 
on some private forestlands in the Sierra, increasing 
fi re hazard in adjacent forests and communities.  Tree 
plantations stocked with densely-stocked, even-
aged, nursery-grown conifers have their needles 
and branches close to the ground and tend to have 
interlocking crowns; consequently, they form a 
continuous aerial fuel mass that can easily ignite and 
spread as a crown fi re.  This is why plantations are 
susceptible to severe fi re damage even from low-to-
moderate intensity fi res. 
Because young timber plantations pose such extreme 
fi re risks and fuel hazards, they must be managed 
with complete fi re exclusion.  It takes just a few 
scattered plantations to put whole areas at risk of 
uncharacteristically severe fi re, and thus, plantations 
zones are managed for fi re exclusion, causing 
hazardous fuel loads to accumulate over time.  The 
presence of these plantations compels adjacent public 
land management agencies to design expensive 
thinning treatments near plantations to increase 
successful suppression operations and induces fi re 
fi ghters to take risky actions to aggressively fi ght fi res 
burning in plantation zones—even fi res that otherwise 
could have been used for fuel treatment and ecological 
benefi ts (Ingalsbee, 1997).
The new threat: Rural development
In recent years, the Sierra has begun to experience 
a development boom, fueled by retirees and second 
homeowners.  In contrast to previous eras where 
growth was clustered around small, tight-knit towns, 
today’s population growth is characterized by low-
density rural “ranchette” development and leapfrog 
subdivisions where houses are scattered across 
the landscape.  In some parts of the Sierra, rural 
residential development is outstripping all other 
types of development by a ratio of 10 to 1 (California 
Department of Conservation, 2006).  This type of 
development makes forest management with regular 
Sierra forest before and after mechanical fuel treatment. 
Photos by Zeke Lunder.
controlled burning very diffi cult.  Rural development 
 also puts more lives and homes in danger.  This 
newthreat to fi re management is the central issue 
explored in this report.
Conclusion
In recent decades, forest managers and residents in the 
Sierra have begun to recognize the integral role of fi re 
in Sierra forests.  We now understand that fi re cannot 
be eliminated or suppressed – it must be carefully 
managed.  In the next chapter, we explore how 
population growth and wildfi re are both on the rise in 
the Sierra, with potentially dangerous consequences.
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2For the last several decades, the number of people 
living in high fi re threat areas of the Sierra has 
increased dramatically, resulting in increasing confl icts 
between people and fi re.  That growth is projected 
to continue over the next forty years.  Other factors, 
such as climate change and the conversion of private 
forestland to highly-fl ammable plantations, are also 
contributing to a ‘perfect fi restorm’ where more lives 
and homes will be at risk of catastrophic wildfi re.
Ranchettes and the 
wildland urban interface
In many parts of the rural west, including the Sierra, 
the predominant form of new development is low-
density “rural ranchettes” where houses are scattered 
at low densities (1 house per 2-80 acres) in a sea of 
wildland vegetation.  
In many parts of the Sierra, ranchette development is 
the only game in town.  For example, between 2002 
and 2004, 261 acres of ranchland in Amador County 
were converted to urban development (commercial, 
industrial and medium density housing).  During that 
same time period, 3,100 acres of agricultural land 
in Amador County were converted to ranchettes.  In 
other words, ranchette development is outstripping 
urban development by a ratio of 10 to 1 (California 
Department of Conservation, ibid).
This type of development creates a ‘wildland urban 
interface’ (see sidebar) that is extremely problematic 
for fi re management.  Preventing and fi ghting wildfi re 
in the wildland urban interface (WUI) is extremely 
diffi cult and resource-intensive. 
Fires in the WUI tend to burn fast and fi erce, and 
cause many homes to be lost at once. A case in point 
is the 2007 Angora fi re, which began in the WUI and 
spread quickly to adjacent homes.  All 242 houses and 
67 commercial buildings destroyed by the fi re were 
lost during the fi rst twelve hours (Norman, 2007).  
In the 1990 Painted Cave fi re in Santa Barbara, 479 
homes were destroyed, most within two hours of the 
initial report (Cohen, 2000).
The wildland urban interface in the Sierra and the rural 
West is growing larger, and exposing more people to 
risk, every year.  Population growth and wildland fi re 
are, quite literally, on a collision course in the Sierra.  
Fire and population growth: 
Recent trends in the western US
In states throughout the West, increasing numbers 
of homes are being built in high fi re threat areas, 
dramatically increasing the size of the wildland urban 
interface.  According to a study by researchers at 
the University of Wisconsin, in the Rocky Mountain 
states (AZ, CO, ID, KS, MT, ND, NE, NM, NV, SD, 
UT, WY), the number of homes in the WUI grew by 
67.8% between 1990 and 2000 (Radeloff, 2005).
As the number of homes has grown, so has the sheer 
size of the wildland urban interface itself.  From 1990 
to 2000, the WUI in the Rocky Mountain states grew 
by 2,089,895 acres, an increase of 30.2%.  In Nevada, 
the number of homes in the WUI grew by a whopping 
91.7% during the same time period (Radeloff, ibid).
What is the Wildland Urban Interface?
The wildland urban interface, or WUI, is a term 
developed by fi re managers to designate places 
where development is interspersed with areas that 
are prone to wildland fi re.  The USDA defi nes the 
WUI as “the area where houses meet or comingle 
with undeveloped wildland vegetation.” 
There are two types of wildland urban interface: 
In areas where developed cities share a distinct 
boundary with the adjacent wildland, the WUI is 
known as interface WUI.  In areas where low-den-
sity development is intermingled with wildland 
vegetation, it is know as intermix WUI. 
Source: USDA and USDI. 2001. Urban wildland interface 
communities within vicinity of Federal lands that are at high 
risk from wildfi re.  Federal Register 66: 751-777.
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At the same time that the size of the wildland urban 
interface is growing, the frequency and severity of 
wildfi res in the West is also growing. In 2006, a 
study in Science reported there were four times as 
many wildfi res in the last sixteen years than during 
the previous sixteen years.  The total area burned 
by those fi res also increased dramatically, by 650%. 
Much of this increased fi re activity was concentrated 
in mid-elevation forests in Northern California and the 
Northern Rockies (Westerling, 2006).
The same study also found that the recent increase 
in wildfi re activity is correlated with an increase 
in average spring and summer temperature.  This 
indicates that global climate change has probably 
begun to increase the frequency and severity of 
wildland fi re in the western US (Westerling, ibid). 
Projections of further temperature rises, then, most 
likely will entail further increases in wildfi re.
Fire and population growth: 
Recent trends in California
California is infamous for wildland fi res that take 
lives, destroy homes, and char vast expanses of 
wildlands.  The 2003 Old Fire killed six people, 
destroyed 1,000 homes and scorched about 100,000 
acres in the San Bernardino Mountains above San 
Bernardino (USFS, 2003).  Three years later, the 
Esperanza Fire killed fi ve people, destroyed 34 homes, 
and charred 42,000 acres in the same area (CalFire, 
2006). Thirty-six fi refi ghters with the U.S. Forest 
Service and California Department of Forestry have 
died battling California wildfi res since 1990.
Part of the reason California wildland fi res are so 
destructive is that California has the most homes in 
the wildland urban interface of any state. According to 
the University of Wisconsin study, between 1990 and 
2000, the number of homes in California’s wildland 
urban interface increased by 14.5%, to 5.1 million. 
There are a total of 12 million homes in California, 
meaning that nearly one out of every two California 
homes is in the wildland urban interface.(Radeloff, 
ibid).
There are 8 million acres of WUI in California.  Of 
those 8 million acres, about 5.5 million are classifi ed 
by CalFire as high, very high, or extreme wildfi re 
threat (see sidebar) (California LAO, 2005).
The real and potential economic costs of fi re in 
California’s WUI are staggering.  CalFire estimates 
that the replacement value for homes in the wildland 
urban interface 
is $107 
billion for 
the structures 
alone. On 
average, 703 
homes in 
California are lost to wildfi re every year, at a cost of 
$163 million (California Fire Plan, 1996).
These averages belie the enormous social and 
economic costs associated with large, devastating 
fi res.  The costs of the 2003 Old, Grand Prix and 
Padua fi res, including, among other things, fi refi ghting 
expenditures, private insurance payments, and FEMA 
assistance, were estimated by the Forest Service at 
$1.3 billion (Dunn, 2003).
CalFire’s Fire Threat Classes
CalFire’s Fire and Resource Assessment Program 
(FRAP) has developed a rating of wildland fi re 
threat based on the combination of potential fi re 
behavior (Fuel Rank) and expected fi re frequency 
(Fire Rotation) to create a 4-class index for risk 
assessment.  Impacts are more likely to occur and/
or be of increased severity for the higher threat 
classes.
The Fire Threat classes are: Extreme, Very High, 
High, and Moderate.  Areas that do not support 
wildland fuels (e.g. open water, agricultural lands, 
etc) are omitted from the calculation and are con-
sidered ‘Non-fuel.’ Most large urbanized areas 
receive a moderate fi re threat classifi cation to ac-
count for fi res carried by ornamental vegetation 
and fl ammable structures.  
CalFire is currently in the process of develop-
ing new hazard severity zone maps for Califor-
nia which will contain more current information. 
However, at the time of publication, these new 
maps were not fi nalized.  
Source: http://frap.cdf.ca.gov/projects/fi re_threat/ 
Nearly one out of every two 
California homes is in the 
wildland urban interface.
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Fire and population growth: 
Recent trends in the Sierra Nevada
Much of the Sierra, particularly the western foothills, 
are classifi ed by CalFire as “very high” or “extreme” 
fi re threat.  These areas are also the fastest-growing 
parts of the Sierra.
According to new research by Sierra Nevada Alliance, 
between 1990 and 2000, over 88,000 people —a 16% 
increase—moved into areas of the Sierra Nevada 
categorized by CalFire as either a “very high” or 
“extreme” fi re threat.
Our data show that approximately 97% of the 
population growth in the Sierra took place in these 
very high or extreme fi re threat areas.
Table 2.1 on page 8 shows the growth in 
population in “very high” and “extreme” threat 
portions of Sierra Nevada counties between 1990 
and 2000.  
At the 
top of the 
list is El 
Dorado 
County, 
where over 
140,000 
people now 
live in these high fi re risk areas, an increase of over 
27,000 since 1990. Nevada and Placer Counties 
follow with 92,000 and 77,000 people respectively.
County 1990 2000 change % change
El Dorado 113,029 140,261 27,232 24%
Nevada 78,461 91,981 13,520 17%
Placer 66,241 76,877 10,636 16%
Tuolumne 46,732 52,449 5,717 12%
Butte 31,913 35,975 4,062 13%
Calaveras 25,339 30,005 4,666 18%
Amador 24,646 27,998 3,352 14%
Lassen 22,927 25,319 2,393 10%
Madera 18,453 24,303 5,850 32%
Plumas 19,062 20,064 1,001 5%
Mariposa 14,294 17,120 2,826 20%
Kern 15,330 15,754 424 3%
Fresno 13,030 15,652 2,622 20%
Tulare 12,388 13,196 808 7%
Mono 9,000 11,756 2,756 31%
Inyo 10,479 10,325 -155 -1%
Yuba 7,911 8,488 577 7%
Tehama 4,720 4,538 -182 -4%
Sierra 3,133 3,357 224 7%
Alpine 991 1,075 85 9%
Total 538,079 626,492 88,413 16%
Between 1990 and 2000, 97% 
of the Sierra’s population 
growth was in areas consid-
ered very high or extreme 
fi re threat by CalFire.
Table 2.1 Population growth in very high and extreme fi re 
threat areas (in Sierra portions of counties)
Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare CalFire’s fi re 
threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California 
Department of Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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interface is growing quickly
As population in high fi re threat areas grows, so 
too does the size of the wildland-urban interface.  
For this report, Sierra Nevada Alliance analyzed 
regional data from the University of Wisconsin 
study (Radeloff, ibid) to identify how quickly 
the WUI in the Sierra grew between 1990 and 
2000.  (Note: this analysis only includes the 13 
‘core’ Sierra Nevada counties.  See sidebar for 
details). This is the fi rst time this WUI data for 
the Sierra has been analyzed at this regional scale. 
The results are consistent with state and national 
trends:  Between 1990 and 2000, the area of the 
WUI in the core Sierra region grew by 11.55% 
-- 131,000 acres.
 
Table 2.2 on page 9 shows the size of the WUI 
in each core Sierra Nevada county in 2000.  
Not surprisingly, the counties with the largest 
populations also have the largest WUI.
Climate change is increasing the 
prevalence of wildfi re
Even as the Sierra’s wildland urban interface is 
growing, wildfi re in the region is becoming more 
prevalent, 
according to 
a recent study 
published 
in Science.  
In the last 
sixteen years, 
wildfi re 
activity in the Sierra and Northern California has 
increased “substantially.”  
Most of this increased wildfi re activity happened 
in years where spring came early, leaving the 
forests very dry by late summer and vulnerable 
to wildfi re.  The study found that mid-elevation 
forests are particularly sensitive to these changes, 
which are brought on by increasing temperature, a 
direct result of global climate change (Westerling, 
ibid).
Core and Peripheral Sierra Counties
The ‘core’ Sierra Nevada counties are those whose 
populations and land area are entirely or almost 
entirely within the Sierra Nevada.  These include: 
Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, El Dorado, Inyo, Las-
sen, Mariposa, Mono, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Si-
erra and Tuolumne.  
Peripheral Sierra Nevada counties are the foothill 
counties whose population and land area are pre-
dominately in the Central Valley: Butte, Yuba, Te-
hama, Madera, Fresno, Tulare and Kern.  
Between 1990 and 2000, 
the area of the WUI in the 
core Sierra region grew by 
11.55% -- 131,000 acres.
Table 2.2
Area of the Sierra Nevada
Wildland Urban Interface in 2000
(in acres)
County Area of WUI
El Dorado 280,129
Placer 204,784
Nevada 190,892
Calaveras 138,588
Tuolumne 112,350
Mariposa 92,268
Amador 80,067
Lassen 54,006
Plumas 52,409
Mono 35,534
Inyo 16,401
Sierra 6,230
Total: 1,263,658
Source: Radeloff, 2005
2Conclusion: The risk of catastrophic 
wildfi re will grow exponentially
As more and more people look for a home in the 
Sierra, the compounding effects of climate change 
and the expansion of the wildland-urban interface will 
continue to put more lives and property at risk, unless 
we take a hard look at where -- and how -- we grow.  
In the next chapter we explore how population growth 
and development in the wildland-urban interface 
affects fi re management.
Projections for the future: 
More growth in very high risk areas
The California Department of Finance predicts that 
by 2040, the population of the Sierra will triple to 
somewhere between 1.5 million and 2.4 million 
residents.
According to new research by Sierra Nevada Alliance, 
nearly all of this growth will happen in areas of ‘very 
high’ fi re threat.  We used GIS mapping to identify 
the amount of land currently designated for rural 
residential development (parcels from 2 acres to 
80 acres in size) that is also classifi ed as very high, 
or extreme fi re threat by CalFire.  The results are 
troubling:
94% of the land designated for rural residential 
development in the Sierra is in areas classifi ed as very 
high or extreme fi re threat.
The maps in Appendix C (pages 42-45) illustrate the 
extent of lands slated for development in high fi re 
threat areas. A summary of results for each county 
is in Table 2.3 on page 11.  More detailed results for 
each county can be found in Appendix A. Figure 2.4 
on page 10 shows the breakdown of lands slated for 
development by fi re threat. 
Our analysis clearly shows that the problem of 
population growth in high fi re threat areas of the Sierra 
will only increase in coming years.  As more people 
move into these areas, the size of the wildland urban 
interface will increase, bringing with it increased risk 
of catastrophic wildfi re and loss of life and property.
Climate change will compound threat
This problem will be compounded by global warming, 
which will lead to larger and more frequent wildland 
fi res in the Sierra.  According to a 2003 California 
Department of Forestry report, fi re behavior models 
predict “a sharp increase in both ignitions and fi re 
spread under warmer temperatures combined with 
lower humidity and drier fuels. . . the net result being 
an expected increase in both fi re frequency and size,” 
(CalFire, 2003).
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Figure 2.1 Fire Threat on Lands 
Designated for Rural Residential 
Development in the Sierra Nevada
High Fire
Hazard
2%
Extreme Fire
Hazard
6%
Moderate or
No Fire
Hazard
4%
VeryHigh
Fire Hazard
88%
As noted earlier, there is already ample evidence to 
demonstrate that climate change is already leading 
to drier, hotter summers and increased frequency and 
severity of wildfi re.
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Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21 California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada 
Region (Johnston, 2004). Our analysis only includes those portions of the counties that lie within the Sierra Nevada region, as defi ned 
by the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project study area boundary. We focused on lands classifi ed as low density residential (density range 
1 house per 2-20 acres) and very low density residential (density range 1 house per 20-80 acres).We then overlaid CalFire’s statewide 
Fire Threat map to compare areas where high, very high or extreme fi re threat overlap with areas classifi ed for rural residential 
development. This analysis does not distinguish between lands that are already developed and lands that are not yet developed.  Also, 
we did not examine other land classifi cations, such as commercial, industrial, medium or high density residential, which constitute a 
very small fraction of development in our region.  The General Plan data used for this analysis were compiled in 2000.
Note: Sierra County’s General Plan does not designate any areas for rural residential development.  However there are some areas in 
which the General Plan does not refl ect the reality on the ground.  Because of pre-existing entitlements and grandfathered zoning, there 
are growing rural residential areas in Sierra County (Duber, 2007). This analysis looked only at General Plans, and therefore does not 
refl ect the full potential for rural residential development in Sierra County or, indeed, in other Sierra Nevada counties.
Table 2.3 Percentage of rural residential land that lies within 
very high or extreme fi re threat areas
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Chapter 3
How Does Development Affect Wildland Fire?
Development in high fi re threat areas affects every 
aspect of the fi re cycle, from prevention to ignition to 
recovery.  As we plan for future growth in the Sierra, 
thoughtful consideration of how and where we build 
new homes and businesses, will have a huge impact on 
our ability to co-exist with fi re.
Impact # 1: Development leads to more ignitions.
In California, 90-95% of fi res are caused by humans.  
The vast majority of these ignitions are unintentional: 
Cars, equipment, and debris burning are among the 
major culprits. Statewide, just 5% of fi res are caused 
by lightning (CalFire, 2005).  
Human-caused fi res are most numerous in the 
wildland-urban interface, where people are living in 
close proximity to fl ammable vegetation (Cardille, 
2001). As the density of people living in the WUI 
increases, so too does the number of ignitions.  CalFire 
estimates that an increase in density from one house 
every 50 acres to one house per acre increases the 
number of ignitions by 189% (CalFire, 1997). A study 
of wildfi re in the Great Lakes region found that the 
number of ignitions also increases with road density 
(Cardille, ibid).
Impact # 2: Development makes it more diffi cult 
and costly to fi ght fi res.  Protecting houses and 
other structures in the wildland-urban interface is 
expensive and diffi cult, and fi refi ghters are often put 
in dangerous places they would not otherwise be 
(Rice, 1991).  In the Esperanza fi re, for example, fi ve 
fi refi ghters were killed while trying to protect homes 
on steep slopes where fi re moves quickly.
When a wildland fi re occurs, local, state and federal 
fi refi ghting agencies must make it their highest priority 
to protect homes from the fi re.  Thus when there are 
homes in the path of a major wildland fi re, protecting 
those homes necessarily diverts resources away from 
fi ghting the blaze directly.  (Winter, 2001).  When 
there is a fi re truck parked in the driveway of every 
home, there are fewer trucks doing ‘perimeter control’ 
fi ghting the fi re directly.
This cost difference can be dramatic, as illustrated by 
two recent fi res in Wyoming, one of which occurred in 
the WUI, and the other in an undeveloped wilderness. 
The Boulder Creek Fire of 2000 charred 4,500 acres in 
the Gros Ventre Wilderness, far away from developed 
areas, and cost $750,000 to extinguish.  
In contrast, the Green Knoll Fire of 2001 charred 
4,470 acres in the Bridger Teton National Forest 
near the town of Jackson, where homes were at risk. 
Firefi ghters saved 240 homes at a cost of $13 million, 
or roughly $54,000 per house.  This fi re was over 17 
times more costly than the Boulder Creek fi re, despite 
being the same size (Stanionis, 2006).
Impact # 3: Development limits options for fuel 
reduction and fi re prevention. Once homes are 
introduced into a high fi re threat area, fi re managers 
no longer have the same range of options to manage 
fi re and reduce fuels.  In undeveloped areas, fi re 
managers may allow naturally-caused fi res to burn, 
thus reducing the fuel load and allowing the natural 
fi re cycle to run its course.  During periods when fi re 
danger is low (late fall or early spring) they may also 
set prescribed burns for the same reasons.  
Traditional Sierra neighborhoods, like this one in Quincy, 
have numerous advantages for fi re protection.  Photo by 
Autumn Bernstein.
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ignitions drops off dramatically (Cardille, ibid). This 
may be due to the decreased amount of fl ammable 
fuel in urban settings.  Burning yard waste and using 
machinery such as tractors and large mowers are also 
two major sources of ignitions, and these practices are 
also less common in urban areas.
Infi ll and compact development gets more bang for 
the fuel reduction buck.  Fuel reduction programs 
are very expensive and resource-intensive.  These 
costs are magnifi ed at low densities, where many acres 
often need to be cleared for the sake of protecting 
a single home.  At higher densities, residents in a 
neighborhood or town can pool their resources and 
invest in fuel reduction projects around the perimeter 
of the neighborhood or town, thereby sharing both the 
benefi ts and the costs.
Infi ll and compact development allows for faster 
response times.   Houses in and around a town 
generally have better road networks and are located 
in closer proximity to fi re stations.  In low-density 
areas, homes may be located along roads that are too 
narrow, too steep, and lack the turnarounds necessary 
to accommodate large fi re equipment (Rice, ibid). 
Proximity to fi re stations is also an issue.  Fires that 
start in remote wildland-urban interface areas take 
longer to access, and thus are more likely to develop 
into major fi res before crews can reach them (Cardille, 
ibid). Clustered development makes it easier to 
locate fi re stations within closer proximity to all the 
homes in the area.  These two factors – better roads 
and proximity of fi re stations – make it easier for fi re 
crews to respond quickly to fi res and protect assets in a 
clustered development (Sapsis, ibid).
Water and power are more available in central 
areas. Towns and denser neighborhoods more often 
have centralized water supply and better infrastructure, 
compared to rural development which usually relies 
upon wells for water and often loses electricity during 
major fi res.  Wells are hard to access, especially if the 
electricity isn’t working, and wells also have a lower 
capacity and are less reliable than municipal water 
systems.  These factors can be important in ensuring 
that fi refi ghters have quick, easy access to water and 
electricity to power well pumps. (Sapsis, ibid and Rice, 
ibid).
The incursion of homes into a wildland area makes it 
vastly more diffi cult to do prescribed burns or allow 
natural fi res to burn, requiring more hand-thinning 
and other labor-intensive techniques that allow for 
fuel removal without using fi re that could spread to 
homes.  This increases the costs of fuel reduction and 
means that limited resources are spread more thinly 
across the landscape, thereby increasing the risk of 
catastrophic wildfi re (California LAO, ibid).
Clustered vs. low density development: 
which is better for living with fi re?
Development that is clustered in a traditional town 
design avoids many of these problems.  Historic Sierra 
towns like Auburn, Jackson, Quincy and Truckee 
were built at urban densities, with little or no wildland 
vegetation remaining within the historic town areas.  
The advantages of infi ll and town-centered 
development include:
Compact neighborhoods have a smaller boundary 
to defend.  When houses are clustered together rather 
than spread out, the perimeter of the community is 
smaller, and thus fi refi ghters have a smaller boundary 
to defend in the case of an approaching wildland fi re.  
When the community is spread out over dozens or 
even hundreds of square miles, it takes many more 
resources to defend every home.
There’s usually less wildland fuel in a town.  At 
higher densities, brush, small trees and other wildland 
vegetation are reduced and/or discontinuous, so there 
is often less wildland fuel that can cause a fi re to start 
or spread.  The prevalence of irrigated landscaping 
and paved surfaces also contributes to reducing fuel 
load in urbanized areas.  There is an important caveat, 
however: once a fi re is established in a developed area, 
the houses themselves become a source of fuel, and 
fi rebrands can quickly spread fi re from house to house 
(Sapsis, 1999).   This was true of the Angora wildfi re. 
There are fewer ignitions in a town. Numerous 
studies have shown that as population increases in 
wildland areas, the number of ignitions also increases.  
However, once development reaches an urban or 
suburban density, it has been shown that the number of 
2Compact development uses fire protection resources 
more efficiently.  Where homes are closer together, less 
equipment and crews are needed to defend the same 
amount of homes.  When fire threatens homes that are 
scattered throughout the WUI, one fire truck and crew 
might be parked outside every single wildland home in 
the vicinity of a fire to protect it.  In a town setting, the 
same truck and crew could defend a larger number of 
homes, thereby freeing up resources to protect other areas 
or attack the fire directly (Rice, ibid).
A tale of two foothill communities
To illustrate how clustered development is better for 
fire protection than sprawling development, let’s take 
a hypothetical example. Imagine you have two Sierra 
foothill communities of 1000 homes each.  Both 
communities are located in identical environments: a 
mix of mid-elevation forest and chaparral.  Both have 
a historic town center that is one square mile across 
(640 acres), and both have recently added 1,000 new 
homes.  In one community, let’s call it Ranchetteville, 
those new homes are low-density ranchettes.  In the 
other community, Townville, those 1,000 new homes 
were added in a compact, town-centered fashion.  
Let’s examine the fire implications of each.
Ranchetteville: 
Maximum risk, Minimal protection
In Ranchetteville, the new development is a 5,000 
acre ranch adjacent to the historic town center that 
has been divided into 1,000 parcels.  Each new home 
is on a 5-acre ranchette, intermixed with forest and 
chaparral.  There is a fire station along the main road 
leading through the area, and most homes are accessed 
via a maze of paved and dirt roads, some public, some 
private.  Conditions on these roads vary according 
to the landowner, the time of year, the grade and the 
county budget for road maintenance.  There is no 
centralized water district, so every home has its own 
well and septic system.  
Because this new development is so large, it has 
increased the length of the perimeter of Ranchetteville 
by 9.8 miles, an increase of 245%.  Local fire 
managers in Ranchetteville have a very large boundary 
to defend in the case of a wildland fire.
The average rate of ignitions in this new community is 
very high, since there are so many people driving cars, 
burning debris, and using heavy equipment in this 
forested, low-density setting.  The cost-benefit ratio 
of fuel-reduction projects in this community is very 
low, because the perimeter of the community is long, 
and there is a large amount of flammable wildland 
vegetation within the community itself.  Large 
amounts of forest must be cleared and thinned around 
every home.  The fire station has a large territory to 
cover, and thus the average response time is relatively 
long, increasing the likelihood that fires will burn 
out of control before firefighters can respond.  Road 
conditions, water supply and power generation are all 
challenges.  In the case of a large fire, many trucks and 
crews are needed to protect homes.
Townville: Lower risk, more protection
In our other hypothetical community, the new 
1,000 homes were added a traditional, compact 
neighborhood design on 480 acres directly adjacent 
to the historic town center.  Each home is on slightly 
less than half an acre. All homes are connected to a 
municipal water system, and the number of people 
living in close proximity means that the road network 
is smaller and better maintained, and every home is 
within easy reach of the fire station.  
In Townville, new development is 
clustered around the existing town center.
In Ranchetteville, new development is scattered on 
5-acre parcels far from the existing town center.
14
Figure 3.1 Ranchetteville Figure 3.2 Townville
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In this case, the perimeter of Townville has grown by 
2.5 miles, an increase of just 62% for the same amount 
of population growth.  Fire managers in Townville 
have a much smaller perimeter to protect in the case of 
a wildland fi re.
Within both the community itself and the surrounding 
wildland, the average rate of ignitions is lower.  This 
is because there is less wildland vegetation within the 
community itself – landscaped yards, driveways and 
roads provide fuel breaks.  
The cost-benefi t ratio of doing fuel reductions in 
this community is high, because the perimeter is 
small and there is less wildland vegetation within the 
community itself. Fire managers might want to extend 
fuel treatment into the surrounding wildlands, but 
the bare-bones area that must be treated to keep the 
community safer is dramatically smaller than in the 
case of Ranchetteville.
When a fi re starts inside the community, fi re crews 
can respond quickly because the fi re station is within 
easy reach of every home.  Water and power are in 
ready supply.  In the case of a large wildland fi re 
bearing down on the town, crews have a much smaller 
perimeter to defend, and smaller numbers of trucks 
and crews are needed to defend each home.  Thus, 
more resources can be directed toward the fi re itself.
Conclusion: Town-centered development 
can save lives, assets and money
Development in high fi re threat areas of the Sierra 
is inherently dangerous, and the risk of catastrophic 
wildfi re and its associated loss of life and property is, 
to a certain extent, unavoidable.  However, community 
design can play a large role in minimizing exposure 
and reducing losses.  Town-centered development 
has numerous advantages over low-density, rural 
residential development when it comes to fi re safety, 
and these factors should be considered by counties, 
cities and developers when planning for new 
development in the Sierra.  
Ranchetteville Townville
Number of new homes 1,000 1,000
Average parcel size 5 acres .48 acres
New perimeter to defend 9.8 miles 2.5 miles
Tuolumne City, near Sonora, illustrates what Townville 
might look like.  Photo by Darin Dinsmore.
Low-density development near the town of Arnold illustrates 
what Ranchetteville might look like.  Photo by Darin Dinsmore.
Table 3.1 Perimeters of Ranchetteville and Townville after new development
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Subsidizing Disaster:
Who Pays for Protecting Unsafe Development?
The costs of fi ghting wildfi re are 
staggering, and they continue to 
grow every year.  Protecting and 
rebuilding homes in the wildland 
urban interface adds substantially 
to these costs, much of which are 
borne by the taxpayers and the 
public at large.
The federal government, the State 
of California and local governments 
all have a role in managing wildfi re 
in the Sierra and each of them plays 
some role in subsidizing unsafe 
development.  Currently the state 
and federal governments shoulder 
a disproportionately large burden 
of fi re protection costs, while it is 
local governments that are approving 
development that compounds fi re 
danger.  Figure 4.1 on page 16 shows a breakdown of 
fi re agency budgets.
Automatic aid agreements 
Most fi re protection agencies in the Sierra operate 
under agreements that the closest fi refi ghting unit will 
respond to a fi re, regardless of whose jurisdiction it 
falls in.  Thus, if a fi re breaks out on national forest 
land and the nearest fi re station is operated by the 
California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 
then CalFire will respond until the Forest Service 
is able to take over.  The Forest Service will then 
reimburse CalFire for the costs it incurred in fi ghting 
the fi re. 
Local Governments: 
Stretching thin resources even thinner
Fire Responsibility: Local government agencies 
– in the Sierra, usually county governments- are 
responsible under state law for providing fi re 
protection in densely populated communities (known 
as ‘Local Responsibility Areas’ and defi ned as 
more than 3 houses per acre).  To do so, most local 
governments have established fi re districts and/or fi re 
departments that protect homes and businesses within 
fi xed geographic boundaries.  Local governments 
also frequently take the lead in protecting homes 
and structures in wildland areas known as State 
Responsibility Areas, or SRAs, discussed below. 
Some Sierra counties, cities and fi re districts contract 
with CalFire to provide fi re protection and emergency 
services in Local Responsibility Areas, rather than 
have their own separate fi re departments.  These 
contracts are referred to as “Schedule A” agreements. 
These agreements are common in rural Sierra 
counties with small populations, where it makes 
better economic sense to pay CalFire to provide these 
services.  In these instances, CalFire is reimbursed by 
the county or city for providing local fi re protection.
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State, local and federal wildlife agency budgets
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Annual spending on wildfi re in California: For the 
last several years, California counties have experi-
enced double-digit increases in fi re protection spend-
ing. In 2004-2005, California counties spent $352 
million on fi re protection, a 12.5% increase over the 
year before (California State Controller, 2007).
Where the money comes from: Local fi re agencies 
are usually funded by the County’s general fund, spe-
cial property taxes, or special assessment districts.  As 
a result of Proposition 13 and other state fi scal poli-
cies, local governments in California have far fewer 
discretionary funds than they did 30 years ago.  As a 
result, general funds are stretched thinner, even while 
development puts more and more pressure on existing 
fi re resources.
How local governments are subsidizing unsafe 
development: Every time a new house is built in 
the WUI, that home is added to the growing pool of 
homes sharing a fi nite resource:  the local fi re response 
system.  This includes fi re stations, trucks and engines, 
fi refi ghters and dispatchers, roads, fuel reduction pro-
grams and emergency water supplies.  Increasing the 
number of homes in a fi re district without increasing 
the capacity of the district itself means longer response 
times, fewer proactive inspections, and fewer fuel 
reduction and community education programs.
Thus, existing residents are subsidizing every new 
home that is built in their district.  A report by the 
California Legislative Analyst’s Offi ce found that:
 
“As the number of structures in and adjacent to 
wildland areas continues to grow, the costs for 
structure protection in connection with wildland 
fi res have increased signifi cantly.” (California 
LAO, ibid)
Some jurisdictions now levy impact fees on every 
new home to offset the additional burden on local fi re 
districts.  However, nationwide studies of impact fees 
consistently fi nd that most impact fees fall far short of 
fully offsetting the true costs of new development.  A 
study by Virginia Tech found that impact fees need to 
be increased an average of 8 to 22 times.
State of California: 
Robbing Peter to protect Paul? 
Fire responsibility: The California Department of 
Forestry and Fire Protection, also known as CDF 
or CalFire, is responsible for fi re protection on all 
rural lands in California that are not owned by the 
federal government. This includes private forest and 
ranchlands and rural lands owned by the state and 
local governments.  These lands are known as “State 
Responsibility Areas,” or SRAs.  There are 31 million 
acres classifi ed as SRAs in California.  Less than 1% 
of SRAs are public land.  Figure 4.2 lists the acreage 
of SRAs in all Sierra counties. Other state agencies, 
including the Offi ce of Emergency Services, Department 
of Corrections, and Department of the Youth Authority 
also play a limited role in fi ghting fi res in conjunction 
with CalFire (California LAO, ibid).
When the SRA system was originally set up during 
World War II, State Responsibility Areas in the Sierra 
were sparsely populated timber and ranchlands, where 
very few lives and homes were jeopardized by wildfi re.  
They were considered worthy of statewide protection 
because of the timber and watershed values they 
provided.  Today, however, SRAs include some of the 
fastest-growing parts of the Sierra. 
County Acres County Acres
Alpine 38,200 Modoc 628,600
Amador 291,400 Mono 198,100
Butte 525,100 Nevada 386,900
Calaveras 526,700 Placer 384,400
El Dorado 564,600 Plumas 428,800
Fresno 763,500 Shasta 86,900
Inyo 218,600 Sierra 794,800
Kern 1,764,500 Tehama 1,276,600
Lassen 1,028,200 Tulare 603,000
Madera 373,000 Tuolumne 356,100
Mariposa 442,900 Yuba 213,700
Total 11,894,600
Table 4.2 
State Responsibility Areas (SRAs) by County 
(includes entire county, not just Sierra portion)
2CalFire’s role is supposed to be fighting wildland fire, 
while local fire districts protect homes and structures.  
In practice, however, protection of life and property 
is rightly CalFire’s top priority and frequently local 
districts lack the capability to protect all homes, so 
CalFire often winds up playing this role as well.  
In some counties, CalFire is the sole fire protection 
agency, having entered so-called ‘Schedule A 
agreements’ to provide all the County’s fire protection 
services, even in local responsibility areas.  These are 
usually very rural counties that lack the tax base and/
or population density to sustain an independent fire 
district.  These counties essentially ‘contract’ out their 
fire protection to CalFire.
CalFire’s role doesn’t stop there.  As rural parts of the 
Sierra become increasingly developed, CalFire’s costs 
for responding to non-fire (usually medical) emergencies 
in those areas also increases.  According to the 
California Legislative Analyist’s Office: 
“In the fast-growing foothill region of the Sierra, 
CalFire reports that the number of its life protection-
related emergency responses more than doubled 
between 1993 and 2000 – increasing from 10,000 to 
25,000 responses.” (California LAO, ibid).
Annual spending on wildfire: $500 million
Where the money comes from: CalFire’s firefighting 
programs are almost exclusively funded by the State of 
California’s General Fund.  Reimbursements from local 
fire districts account for 3% of CalFire’s budget. Another 
3% comes from federal trust funds, and the remaining 
94% comes from the General Fund (California LAO, 
ibid). 
How the State of California is subsidizing unsafe 
development: CalFire’s firefighting operations are 
funded almost exclusively by the General Fund – in 
other words, by California taxpayers.  But where is the 
public benefit to justify this public financing?  The SRA 
system was originally set up to protect undeveloped 
wildlands that provide benefit to the general public by 
providing quality drinking water and timber.  Besides, 
the cost of fighting fires in undeveloped wildlands 
remained relatively low for many years.
Figure 4.3  
CalFire’s Wildland Fire Protection Expenditures 1994-2004 
(in millions)  
 
Federal Government: Protecting more than just national forests 
What they do: The USDA Forest Service is primarily responsible for managing fire on 
federal lands.  In the Sierra, there are 8.5 million acres of land managed by the Forest 
Service (Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project, 1996).  Like CalFire, the Forest Service areas 
of responsibility co-mingle with private lands in many places, so the Forest Service also 
has agreements with local agencies to help respond to nearby fires, even if those fires 
don’t occur on federal land (California LAO, ibid). 
The federal government also plays a role in post-fire recovery, usually through the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency.  FEMA provides loans and grants to assist fire 
victims in rebuilding their homes and businesses.  
 
Annual spending on wildfire (nationwide): $1-1.5 billion (USDA Office of Inspector 
General, ibid). 
 
 
Source: California LAO, ibid 
But as development increases in SRAs, bringing with 
it inc eased hazards and costs, who is paying for those 
increased costs, and who is benefiting?
In theory, local fire districts reimburse CalFire for costs 
incur ed in prot cti g homes and structures, but the e 
reimbursements cover only 3% of CalFire’s annual 
budget. Meanwhile, the costs of fighting fire in SRAs 
have increased an average of 10% per year over the 
last decade, and much of this increased cost is due to 
increasing numbers of homes in SRAs.  According to the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office, “Increasing development in 
the WUI translates into increased fire protection costs.” 
(California LAO, ibid).
Figure 4.3 shows CalFire’s increasing expenditures for 
wildland fire protection between 1994 and 2004.  The 
budget is divided into two figures: base budget and 
emergency fund. The base budget includes the day-to-
day costs of operating CalFire facilities, fighting fires, 
payments to contract counties, and fire prevention costs.  
When additional resources are needed to fight large fires, 
these come out of the Emergency Fund.
As development continues in SRAs, these costs will also 
continue to rise, increasing the disparity between who 
pays for fire protection -- all taxpayers; and who benefits 
-- homeowners in the WUI.
Figure 4.3 
CalFire’s Wildland Fire Protection 
Expenditures 1994-2004 (in millions) 
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Federal Government: Protecting 
more than just national forests
What they do: The USDA Forest Service is primarily 
responsible for managing fi re on federal lands.  In the 
Sierra, there are 8.5 million acres of land managed by 
the Forest Service (Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project, 
1996).  Like CalFire, the Forest Service areas of 
responsibility co-mingle with private lands in many 
places, so the Forest Service also has agreements with 
local agencies to help respond to nearby fi res, even 
if those fi res don’t occur on federal land (California 
LAO, ibid).
The federal government also plays a role in post-fi re 
recovery, usually through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.  FEMA provides loans and 
grants to assist fi re victims in rebuilding their homes 
and businesses. 
Annual spending on wildfi re (nationwide): $1-1.5 
billion (USDA Offi ce of Inspector General, ibid).
Where the money comes from: The USDA Forest 
Service is funded primarily by general fund allocations 
from Congress, with limited reimbursements from 
local fi re districts.
How the federal government is subsidizing unsafe 
development:  A 2006 audit by the USDA’s Inspector 
General found that protecting WUI 
homes adjacent to federal land was 
responsible for 50-95% of the $1 
billion spent annually by the Forest 
Service to suppress large wildfi res 
nationwide.  (USDA Offi ce of Inspector 
General, 2006).  If that number is 
correct, then the federal government 
is providing subsidies of $500 million 
to $1 billion per year for individual 
homeowners in the wildland urban 
interface.  
By doing so, the audit contends, the 
Forest Service is removing incentives 
for homeowners to take responsibility 
for their homes.  The audit recommends 
that state and local governments that 
approve development in the WUI 
should shoulder more fi nancial 
responsibility for fi re suppression in those areas.  
(USDA Offi ce of Inspector General, ibid).
Conclusion: State, federal and local 
agencies are all subsidizing unsafe 
development
Local, state and federal agencies all play an important 
role in fi re management in the Sierra.  CalFire and 
the US Forest Service are larger and better funded 
than local fi re districts, so when a major wildfi re 
sweeps through the region, these two agencies often 
shoulder most of the burden.  Both agencies are 
funded by the taxpayers at large, not the individual 
WUI homeowners whose homes are in danger.  Thus, 
homeowners in the WUI are essentially getting a 
public subsidy from the state and federal governments 
to build homes in unsafe places.
Local governments are also responsible for 
subsidizing unsafe development because they are 
the agencies which approve new development in the 
fi rst place.  Local governments can help ensure that 
new development pays a fair share of fi re protection 
costs, by imposing impact fees on new homes that 
fl ow to local fi re districts.  However, very few local 
governments in the Sierra charge any impact fees 
whatsoever, let alone fees that are adequate to cover 
the costs of fi re protection.  
State, federal and local agencies all play a role in subsidizing unsafe 
development in fi reprone areas.  Photo by Zeke Lunder.
2The interrelationship of fi re and development in the 
WUI is not news to fi re managers, land use planners 
and decision makers.  However, the status quo doesn’t 
do enough to ensure that we are minimizing the risk to 
lives, assets, watersheds, wildlife and ecosystems.
Current fi re prevention policy focuses on site-specifi c 
solutions such as clearing defensible space, selecting 
building sites to minimize fi re danger, and building 
with fi re-retardant materials.  In this chapter we 
discuss the limitations of this approach, and argue 
that fi re-safe planning must evolve to look at the 
neighborhood and community scale.
The current policy framework: 
Site-specifi c requirements
Currently, fi re-safe planning relies primarily upon 
building and zoning codes that apply to individual 
homes and/or building sites, or sometimes new 
subdivisions.  This system places the burden 
of responsibility on individual homeowners or 
developers, who implement the standards at a 
site- or subdivision-specifi c level during and after 
construction.  When new homes are sold, the owners 
are responsible for ensuring the homes stay up to code.
These codes often mandate that new homesites 
provide adequate road access, water and power.  
Non-fl ammable building materials and fi re-retardant 
vegetation may be required.  Builders may be 
required to site a new building away from steep 
slopes, ridgelines or other especially hazardous areas.  
Homeowners may be required to maintain defensible 
space around the home by cutting trees and shrubs.
The creation of these codes has been an important step 
toward improving fi re safety and decreasing losses of 
life in the WUI.  However, current research and the 
historical record show that this site-specifi c approach 
to fi re safe planning has serious shortcomings.
For example, many of the 1,000 homes that burned 
in the 2003 Old and Grand Prix Fires in Southern 
California were in compliance with local fi re safety 
codes. In the 18 months after these devastating 
fi res, cities and counties in the Inland Empire 
issued permits for another 2,500 homes in areas of 
‘extreme’ or ‘very high’ fi re danger (Miller, 2005).
Homeowner reluctance: 
An obstacle to implementing codes
One major problem confounding the success of 
fi resafe codes targeted at individual homeowners 
is the reluctance of the homeowners themselves.  
Numerous studies have shown that fi re safety 
programs focused on changing individual 
homeowner behavior have limited success, 
because many 
homeowners 
are concerned 
about the cost 
and aesthetics 
of fi resafe 
strategies, and 
they question 
the effectiveness 
of the programs 
(Nelson, 2005).  
Nationwide, the majority of new homeowners in 
the WUI take no action to reduce their home’s 
risk of wildfi re (National Academy of Public 
Administration, 2002).
Yet most fi resafe building and zoning codes are 
predicated on the assumption that homeowners 
in high fi re risk areas will keep their homes up to 
code.  While many codes impose fi nes on homes 
that are out of compliance, enforcement of the 
codes in most parts of California is sporadic at best, 
due to lack of funds.  Enforcement duties generally 
fall upon local fi re departments that often don’t 
have the resources to enforce the code.  
For instance, in 2004 Riverside County fi refi ghters 
issued 20,000 warning notices to homes that were 
out of compliance with fi re safety codes, but were 
Many of the 1,000 homes 
that burned in the 2003 Old 
and Grand Prix Fires in 
Southern California were 
in compliance with local 
fi re safety codes 
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unable to follow up on most of the warning notices.  In 
total, only 15 citations were issued (Miller, ibid)
Clearly, the current practice of requiring individual 
homeowners to implement fi re safety practices is 
important and shouldn’t be discarded.  However, 
given the documented shortcomings of these programs 
with regard to homeowner reluctance and lack of 
enforcement, planning and zoning codes need to look 
beyond individual homes and building sites to ensure 
that new development is safer.
What we’re missing: The big picture
What all these zoning and building codes fail to do is 
look at fi re in the larger planning context.  In every 
community there are areas which are more dangerous 
to develop and areas which are safer.  Topography, 
vegetation, slope, proximity to existing emergency 
services, roads, and municipal water supply are just 
some of the features which can help determine which 
areas are safer for development, and which are more 
dangerous.  By looking at fi re danger at the scale 
of the entire community, rather than the individual 
property, city planners and fi re managers can direct 
growth into safer areas, and limit development in areas 
of extreme hazard (Schwab, 2005).
Disconnect between who approves 
development and who protects it
So why are local governments not looking at fi re in 
this larger context?  Why are they relying upon site-
specifi c planning for fi re safety?
One major reason is the disconnect between who 
approves new development and who pays the 
cost of protecting that development from fi re.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, state and federal 
agencies shoulder the vast majority of fi refi ghting 
costs in California’s wildlands.  However, it is local 
governments – in the Sierra, usually counties  – who 
are responsible for developing land use policies and 
zoning codes and approving development.  As the 
California Legislative Analyst’s Offi ce puts it:
“The decisions on where and how these homes 
are built are generally made at the local level.  
However, the consequences of these decisions are 
experienced at both the state and local level. . . 
when a large wildland fi re threatens a development, 
fi refi ghting resources for structure and life 
protection beyond those available at the local 
level are often needed. The cost of those additional 
resources is generally borne by state taxpayers 
rather than local residents.” (California LAO, ibid).
Local governments in California, especially rural 
counties like those in the Sierra, are cash-strapped 
and often struggle to sustain important programs like 
health care and road maintenance as well as public 
safety. The reasons for this poor fi scal situation are 
many and complicated, but the end result is that cities 
and counties across California, particularly in rural 
areas, are desperate for cash.  New development 
of any kind generates short-term revenue that local 
governments can use to meet their budgets. This 
creates a powerful incentive for local governments 
to approve new development despite potential 
consequences to public safety and the environment.
Because local governments shoulder just a fraction of 
the costs of fi ghting wildland fi re and receive most of 
the short-term economic benefi ts of approving new 
development, there is little fi nancial incentive for them 
to keep development out of dangerous areas.  
The myth of subdivision rights
In addition, some local government offi cials operate 
under the mistaken assumption that landowners have 
a legal right to subdivide and develop their land 
as much as they wish, regardless of the impacts to 
the community as a whole.  This assumption is not 
legally correct, as State and Federal Courts have 
repeatedly held that there is no right to subdivide and 
split parcels.  Both the state and federal governments 
delegate land use planning responsibilities to local 
governments, and require only that landowners must 
be allowed some economic use of their land, not any 
economic use.  Since most landowners do enjoy some 
economic use of their land (such as farming, grazing, 
logging and building one house per parcel), there is no 
legal justifi cation for allowing new subdivisions that 
jeopardize public safety.  California Government Code 
section 66474 states that a subdivision may be denied 
if it is “likely to cause public. . . safety problems.”
In the next chapter, we explore ways that federal, state 
and local policy can be reformed to encourage fi re-safe 
planning at the community scale.
2“Including fi re standards in general plans and 
subdivision regulations is not enough to prevent 
the devastation of a major fi re.  The fact is that 
32 million Californians live in a tinderbox.  And 
with a half-million more per year on the way, 
it’s impossible to change the situation – unless 
public offi cials and the voters who elect them 
decide they’re willing to pass regulations that 
would keep people from building in the woods.”
- Bill Fulton, California planning expert
  (Fulton, 1995)
So what can local communities and state and federal 
agencies do to improve land use planning to prevent 
catastrophic wildfi re in the Sierra?  
We propose that land use planning in high fi re threat 
areas should adhere to the following principles:
1. Make development pay its own way
2. Cluster development in and around existing     
communities
3. Don’t build in unsafe places
4. Manage the forested landscape to restore    
resiliency and reduce fi re hazard
5. Improve planning and budgeting processes 
to fully address risks
An initial investment in improving and updating 
General Plans and zoning codes will be cheaper than 
trying to fi ght fi res in poorly-planned communities 
twenty years from now.  This chapter explores each 
principle and recommends actions that communities 
and government agencies can take to implement them.
Fire-Safe Planning Principle 1: 
Make development pay its own way
Landowners contemplating development in high fi re 
threat areas should be required to pay the full cost for 
protecting new development from fi re.  Such a policy 
would both discourage irresponsible development and 
ensure that taxpayers aren’t unfairly shouldering the 
burden for protecting new homes in unsafe areas.  The 
State of California used to impose a state fi re protection 
fee on homeowners in areas where CalFire is the only 
source of fi re protection (State Responsibility Areas 
or SRAs).  In the years since the State of California 
suspended this fee, CalFire’s costs for providing fi re 
protection have skyrocketed.  We suggest that the State of 
California and local governments should work together 
to reinstate such a fee that helps offset both state and local 
costs in protecting these homes.
To implement this principle, local, state and federal 
agencies can take the following actions:
Local Government Actions:
Impose impact fees that pay true costs: Cities and 
counties should levy fi re impact fees on new development 
that refl ect the true cost of providing fi re protection and 
fuel reduction over the long term.  These fees should be 
collected annually by the local government in conjunction 
with property taxes.  The fees should be used to fund 
local fi re districts and fuel reduction programs.  The fee 
program should be structured to refl ect relevant factors 
such as development intensity, fi re risk, and proximity 
to existing roads and services.  Voluntary fuel reduction 
measures by homeowners should be rewarded with lower 
fees.
Assist CalFire in collecting a state fi re protection fee: 
When local governments approve new development in 
areas where CalFire must provide fi re protection (State 
Responsibility Areas, or SRAs), they should work with 
Chapter 6
Principles for Planning 
Fire-Safe Sierra Communities
22
23
CalFire to impose and collect a reinstated fi re protection 
fee (see State of California recommendations, below).   
Local governments should also help CalFire impose 
reinstated fi re protection fees when existing homes within 
SRAs are sold or transferred.
Establish fi re assessment districts in already-developed 
areas:  To improve fi re safety in already-developed areas, 
local governments and voters can establish fi re assessment 
districts (see sidebar).  Revenue generated from annual 
assessments should be used to fund the local fi re districts 
and fuel reduction programs.
State of California Actions:
Reinstate fi re protection fees linked to 
development:  The State of California should 
reinstate fi re protection fees that are linked to 
development intensity in SRAs.  Unlike the fl at fee 
which was debated in the California Legislature in 
2004-2005, this fee should only apply to parcels 
which are developed.  To minimize costs associated 
with administering such a program, the state could 
work with local governments to collect the fee in 
conjunction with subdivision approvals, issuance of 
building permits, and property tax reassessment.
Fire-Safe Planning Principle 2: 
Cluster development in and around 
existing communities
While no development in high fi re threat areas is 
completely safe, clustering development in and around 
existing communities has numerous benefi ts for fi re 
response and prevention.  Local governments should 
encourage infi ll development and concentric outward 
growth while discouraging rural sprawl. There is 
a range of planning tools available to help local 
governments direct growth into appropriate locations.
Local Government Actions:
Promote infi ll fi rst:  Putting new development within 
existing communities, rather than allowing it to sprawl 
outward, can help prevent the expansion of the WUI, 
keep emergency response times short and make 
fuel-reduction programs more cost-effi cient.  Local 
governments should identify infi ll sites and encourage 
development of these areas.   Tools such as redevelop-
ment, transfer of development rights programs, and 
Defi nitions
Fire Assessment District: An Assessment District 
is a special district formed by a local government 
agency and includes property that will receive direct 
benefi t from the new public improvements or from 
the maintenance of existing public improvements.  
Fire Assessment Districts often pay for fuel reduction 
programs, construction of new fi re stations, and other 
improvements.  The local agency that forms the 
assessment district sells bonds to raise the money to 
build or acquire the public improvement. The agency 
then levies a special assessment against each parcel 
of land within the district, which is included on the 
County’s general property tax bill. 
Impact fee: An impact fee is a fee assessed on new 
development, usually by a local government. The 
purpose is to pay for expansion of new infrastructure 
such as fi re stations, sewer and water, parks, and 
other government services.  Impact fees may also 
be assessed to offset impacts to the environment or 
surrounding community. The fees are used to mitigate 
the impacts of the development.
State fi re protection fee: Historically, the state of 
California collected a fi re protection fee from all 
private properties located in a State Responsibility 
Area (areas that receive fi re protection from 
CALFIRE).  This fee used to offset CALFIRE’s cost 
for protecting these properties from fi re.  The fi re 
protection fee was suspended and recent attempts to 
reinstate the fee were unsuccessful.
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR):  TDR is 
a market-based approach used by local governments 
to encourage development in certain places, and 
discourage development in others. TDR programs 
allow landowners to sever development rights 
from properties in areas that are to be protected as 
open space, and sell those development rights to 
landowners to increase the density of development in 
areas targeted for intensive development. 
Redevelopment: California law authorizes local 
governments to identifydeteriorated areas where 
market forces alone aren’t suffi cient to revitalize 
the area.  In Sierra communities, these areas are 
often abandoned railyards or lumber mills, or 
historic downtowns that have been left behind by 
highway bypasses or strip development on the edge 
of the community. Through a process known as 
‘redevelopment,’ agencies develop a plan and provide 
the initial funding to encourage private investment 
in those areas.  Redevelopment actions include 
capital improvements, direct public investments, and 
providing tax benefi ts to new development.
2other incentives can be used to encourage infi ll devel-
opment.
Concentric outward growth: Where there is no 
room for infi ll development, local governments should 
encourage concentric outward growth that is compact 
and orderly.  As with infi ll development, such growth 
patterns will discourage rapid WUI growth and use 
fi re prevention and response services effi ciently.  
Concentric outward growth will also help avoid 
creating isolated pockets of wildland vegetation that 
can cause fi res to spread to surrounding homes.  Tools 
such as general plans, urban growth boundaries and 
urban reserve systems can be used to foster concentric 
growth patterns.
Cluster development: New development in remote 
areas far from existing towns and communities 
should be strongly discouraged.  However, in 
situations where development is unavoidable due 
to existing entitlements, communities should be 
designed to minimize fi re danger. New subdivisions 
in remote areas should be designed to optimize safety 
and access, by clustering new lots in low-threat 
areas close to access roads.  These new clustered 
developments should provide a permanent ¼ mile 
buffer of defensible space on all sides.  This buffer 
must be maintained on an ongoing basis.  Local 
governments can require clustering and buffers as part 
of the General Plan, zoning code, and/or subdivision 
regulations.  
California and Federal Government Actions:
Assist in developing local codes and regulations: 
CalFire and the USFS already play an important role 
in reviewing proposed plans, codes and development 
applications in some parts of the Sierra.  CalFire 
and USFS could expand their role in local policy 
development by providing technical assistance, 
planning grants, stakeholder convening, and policy 
development in partnership with local governments.
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Better land use planning can help protect communities from wildfi re while preserving the health of 
Sierra forests, watersheds and wildlife.  Photo by Autumn Bernstein.
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Fire-Safe Planning Principle 3: 
Don’t build in unsafe places
Within a given community or county, some places are 
more prone to fi re danger than others.  Brushy areas, 
steep slopes, ridgelines and south-facing hillsides, for 
example, are often more hazardous than other areas 
within the surrounding landscape.  Other areas may 
pose a particular threat to an established community, 
such as a brushy canyon that sits adjacent to a town.  
New development should be curtailed in places that 
put new or existing residents at increased risk of 
catastrophic wildfi re.
Local Government Actions:
No new parcels in high fi re hazard areas: Use 
zoning and the development code to restrict the 
creation of new parcels in high risk areas outside fi re 
district boundaries.  Maintain zoning in these areas at 
very low densities, such as 160 acres or 320 acres per 
parcel.  Existing smaller parcels are grandfathered in 
such ordinances, but at least further parcelization is 
prevented.
Limit development of existing parcels in high 
fi re hazard areas: Use tools such as conservation 
easements, transfer of development rights programs 
and fee-title acquisition to limit development of 
existing parcels in high fi re hazard areas that have 
multiple resource values (e.g. wildlife, watershed, 
agriculture etc) 
Create fi re protection boundaries:  Establish a 
service boundary for the local fi re district, and require 
new development outside the boundary to reimburse 
the fi re district for 100% of costs rendered to protect 
structures from fi re. 
California and Federal Government Actions:
Enact legislation limiting further subdivision of 
lands in State Responsibility Areas.  Since the State 
of California is responsible for fi re protection in SRAs, 
the state should take action to limit development that 
will increase fi re danger and drive up taxpayer-funded 
fi re protection costs in these areas.
Defi nitions
Incentives for infi ll development: In addition to 
redevelopment, local governments can offer other 
incentives to encourage infi ll development.  These 
include streamlining the permit process, creating 
fl exible zoning codes for infi ll areas, and creating 
a community plan or specifi c plan for the area that 
undergoes environmental review at the plan level, 
thereby reducing the amount of review necessary for 
individual projects within the plan area.
Urban growth boundaries: UGBs designate where 
urban growth will be allowed to occur, and which areas 
will remain as forest or rangeland.  A UGB is essentially 
a line drawn around a community that divides urban 
from rural.  Some UGBs are permanent, while others 
have a ‘sunset’ provision and must be reconsidered 
after 10-30 years.
Clustering ordinance: Local governments use 
clustering ordinances to minimize the footprint of 
new development in remote areas.  New development 
is ‘clustered’ into the portion of the property that 
is the least hazardous, is close to existing roads and 
infrastructure, and/or avoids environmentally-sensitive 
areas.  The remainder of the property is permanently 
protected.
Urban reserves: Urban reserves are areas set aside for 
development at a future time, usually 10-20 years in 
the future.  The designation of urban reserve is usually 
accompanied by a set of ‘triggers’ or thresholds that 
must be achieved in order for development to begin. 
Urban reserves are used to preventing premature or 
‘leapfrog’ growth.
Conservation easements: Conservation easements 
are used by local governments, land trusts or other 
entities to purchase the development rights for a piece 
of property to keep it undeveloped, while allowing 
the private owner to retain ownership of the land and 
use it a manner consistent with the easement (such as 
agriculture, timber harvesting or recreation).
Fee-title acquisition: When a local government, land 
trust or other entity purchases a property outright for 
the purpose of conservation, this is known as ‘fee-title 
acquisition.’  
2governed by the state. They do have the authority to 
determine land zoning which does affect forestlands in 
their jurisdiction. If approved by the state Legislature, 
local governments should create a wildland-urban 
interface timber production zone designation that 
would guide timber harvest near communities to 
ensure that any logging that occurs does not increase 
fi re severity behavior that can threaten homes.
State of California Actions: 
Support fuel reduction effort in the WUI:  Increase 
investment in programs to help local communities 
reduce fuels in the WUI.  Provide technical assistance, 
stakeholder convening, grants and personnel to 
develop and implement local fuel reduction plans.
Develop a WUI timber harvest zone: The state 
should develop a wildland urban interface zoning 
designation for forestlands in California so that 
local governments can control forest practices near 
communities to reduce wildfi re risks. The state 
should also pass forest regulation changes that limit 
forest conversion to plantations and require shaded 
fuel breaks in areas adjacent to communities and in 
high priority areas identifi ed in existing emergency 
regulations promulgated by the Board of Forestry.
Federal Government Actions:
Support responsible forest management: Increase 
funding for community pre-fi re suppression activities 
and stewardship contracts.  Increase investment into 
restoration on public lands. Encourage fi re-resilient 
management on private lands.  
Support efforts to protect undeveloped lands: 
State and federal government agencies can provide 
grants to assist with conservation easements and 
fee-title acquisition of certain lands which should 
remain undeveloped, such as those with multiple 
resource values.  In addition, agencies can provide 
planning grants and technical assistance to help 
communities establish local districts to manage 
conservation easements, land acquisition, and transfer 
of development rights programs.
Assist in developing local plans and codes: CalFire 
and the USFS already play an important role in 
local planning in some parts of the Sierra.  CalFire 
and USFS staff often review draft plans, codes and 
development applications and make recommendations. 
CalFire and USFS could expand their role in local 
policy development by providing technical assistance, 
planning grants, stakeholder convening and policy 
development in partnership with local governments.
Fire Safe Planning Principle 4: 
Manage the forested landscape to 
restore resiliency and reduce fi re risk
100 years of fi re suppression and logging large, fi re-
resistant trees have made our forests a tinderbox.  
State, federal and local agencies should support 
responsible forest management practices that restore 
resiliency and reduce the risk of catastrophic crown 
fi re.  In forests near communities that are important for 
protecting life and property, we should not allow forest 
management that increases fi re danger. 
Local Government Actions: 
Work in partnership to manage the local wildland 
urban interface: In those places where local 
community meets the forest, do thinning and treatment 
to manage the WUI. Partner with community 
organizations, fi re safe councils to work at making 
fuels management viable and cost-effective.
Require and enforce defensible space:  Require new 
and existing homeowners to create defensible space 
and implement fi re safe measures around their homes.  
Boost staffi ng and budgeting for enforcement.
Encourage safe timber harvest: Local governments 
have limited authority over forest practices which are 
State, federal and local agencies should partner to 
restore healthy forests.  Photo by Zeke Lunder.
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Fire-safe planning principle 5:
Improve planning and budgeting 
processes to fully address risk
Lastly, all levels of government involved in 
wildland fi re prevention need to improve planning 
and budgeting to adequately plan and prepare for 
coordinated wildfi re prevention and response efforts.  
If we are to take action, we must fi rst understand the 
full scope of the problem.
Local Government Actions:
Bring fi re agencies to the table: Local governments 
should ensure that fi re safe councils, local fi re 
departments, CalFire and USFS have a meaningful 
role in land use planning efforts and decisions.  
Representatives from all fi re agencies should be 
invited to the table early on in planning processes to 
ensure that their concerns are adequately addressed. 
Improve understanding of threats: New analytical 
tools such as fi re behavior modeling can be used 
to assist planners and landowners in mapping 
how wildfi re is likely to burn through an existing 
community or planned development.  These tools can 
identify high wildfi re hazard areas, inform land use 
decisions, and prioritize areas for fuels treatment.
Assess true costs of fi re protection – and budget 
accordingly: Most Sierra counties lack the funding to 
adequately fund fi re prevention.  Funding mechanisms 
such as impact fees and assessment districts are non-
existent or woefully inadequate.  Local governments 
should examine the true, long-term costs of fi re 
prevention and protection and create or expand these 
mechanisms to attain budgetary needs.
State of California Actions:
Strengthen CEQA requirements for fi re threat: The 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 
encourages agencies to consider wildfi re threat as 
a potential impact that should be examined and 
mitigated.  However, this provision is rarely utilized 
and many projects are approved without mitigation.  
The State of California should revise CEQA to 
clarify how impacts should be analyzed and suggest 
mitigation measures.
Conclusion: The choice is ours
The threat of catastrophic wildfi re in Sierra 
communities has increased dramatically in recent 
years and will only get worse unless local, state and 
federal agencies, in partnership with Sierra residents, 
NGOs and community groups, work together to 
address the underlying issues of poor planning and 
subsidies that encourage dangerous development.
Bold leadership and decisive action are needed to 
address these challenges.  Every day that we avoid 
dealing with this problem, more Sierra residents, 
communities, and ecosystems are put at risk.
We can build thriving communities that are safer and 
sustainable, by making an upfront investment in good 
planning that will save lives and money in the long 
run.  Or we can continue with business as usual and 
deal with the consequences every fi re season to come.  
The choice is ours.
Defi nitions
Fire behavior modeling: GIS mapping technology 
has led to the creation of powerful new computer 
programs which allow fi re experts to ‘map’ the likely 
behavior of wildfi re in a community or landscape. 
These programs use fuels, weather, and topographic 
information to create graphical portrayals of potential 
wildfi re spread patterns, rates of spread, and burn 
intensities.
CEQA: CEQA is short for the California Environ-
mental Quality Act.  CEQA requires government 
agencies, including cities and counties, to analyze 
the potential environmental impacts of a proposed 
action – such as approving a new subdivision – and 
‘mitigate’ those impacts to the extent possible.  CEQA 
is the premiere law governing the approval of new 
development in California.
Mitigation: Under CEQA, actions that are taken to 
offset the impacts of a project are called mitigation.  
Mitigation measures are the specifi c requirements 
which will “minimize, avoid, rectify, reduce, elimi-
nate, or compensate” for signifi cant environmental 
effects. See Section 15370 of the CEQA Guidelines 
for a full defi nition.
2Appendix A: 
Fire and Land Use Statistics by County
Alpine County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 4,850 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 1,867 8,816 10,683
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 1,841 8,072 9,913
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 99% 92% 93%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 1,841 8,072 9,913
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 99% 92% 93%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 991 1,075 85 9%
Amador County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 80,067 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 34,735 142,122 176,857
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 34,735 142,122 176,857
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 34,735 142,122 176,857
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 24,646 27,998 3,352 14%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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Calaveras County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 138,588 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 5,666 138,811 144,477
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 5,666 138,796 144,462
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 5,666 138,796 144,462
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 113,029 140,261 27,232 24%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
2El Dorado County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 280,129 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 132,516 45,095 177,611
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 132,516 45,095 177,611
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 132,516 45,095 177,611
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 20003 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 113,029 140,261 27,232 24%
Fresno County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 88,599 118,453 207,052
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 88,176 118,283 206,459
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 88,176 118,283 206,459
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 13,030 15,652 2,622 20%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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Inyo County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 16,401 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 8,695 15,917 24,613
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 6,328 6,815 13,143
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 73% 43% 53%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 6,328 6,815 13,143
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 73% 43% 53%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 10,479 10,325 -155 -1%
Kern County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 67,806 0 67,806
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 39,523 0 39,523
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 58% 0% 58%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 39,523 0 39,523
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 58% 0% 58%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 15,330 15,754 424 3%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
2Madera County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 86,166 132,699 218,865
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 86,166 130,578 216,744
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 98% 99%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 86,166 130,578 216,744
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 98% 99%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 18,453 24,303 5,850 32%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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Mariposa County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 92,268 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 88,424 7,239 95,663
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 88,424 7,239 95,663
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 88,424 7,239 95,663
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 14,294 17,120 2,826 20%
Modoc County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 61,114 66,012 127,126
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 48,092 30,095 78,186
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 79% 46% 62%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 8,160 815 8,975
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 13% 1% 7%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 48,092 30,095 78,186
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 79% 46% 62%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas data not available
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
2Mono County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 35,534 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 8,520 28,033 36,552
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 7,836 23,943 31,779
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 92% 85% 87%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 7,836 23,943 31,779
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 92% 85% 87%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 9,000 11,756 2,756 31%
Nevada County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 190,892 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 156,375 91,311 247,686
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 156,375 91,311 247,686
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 156,375 91,311 247,686
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 78,461 91,981 13,520 17%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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Placer County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 204,784 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 82,673 20,667 103,340
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 82,673 20,667 103,340
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 82,673 20,667 103,340
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 66,241 76,877 10,636 16%
Plumas County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 52,409 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 34,167 128,961 163,127
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 33,424 85,274 118,698
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 98% 66% 73%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 552 790 1,341
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 2% 1% 1%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 33,424 85,274 118,698
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 98% 66% 73%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 19,062 20,064 1,001 5%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
2Sierra County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 6,230 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class
% in Very High Fire Threat Class
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class
Sierra County’s General Plan does not designate
any areas for rural residential development.
However there are some areas in which the
General Plan does not reflect the reality on the
ground. Because of pre-existing entitlements and
grandfathered zoning, there are growing rural
residential areas in Sierra County (Duber, 2007).
This analysis looked only at General Plans, and
therefore does not reflect the full potential for
rural residential development in Sierra County.
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 3,133 3,357 224 7%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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Tulare County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 25,935 73,929 99,864
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 25,935 73,661 99,596
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 25,935 73,661 99,596
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 12,388 13,196 808 7%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
2Tuolumne County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: 112,350 acres
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 48,880 15,346 64,226
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 48,722 15,346 64,069
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 48,722 15,346 64,069
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 46,732 52,449 5,717 12%
Yuba County
Area of Wildland Urban Interface 1: data not available
Residential Land and Fire Threat 2 ResidentialLow
Residential
Very Low
Residential
Total
Total Acres in Land Use Designation 82,701 46,065 128,766
Acres in Very High Fire Threat Class 82,701 46,065 128,766
% in Very High Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Acres in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0 0
% in Extreme Fire Threat Class 0% 0% 0%
Total Acres in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 82,701 46,065 128,766
% in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Class 100% 100% 100%
Population Growth from 1990 to 2000 3 1990 2000 Change % Change
Popn in Very High or Extreme Fire Threat Areas 7,911 8,488 577 7%
1. Data is for entire County. Source: Radeloff, VC, RB Hammer, SI Stewart, JS Fried, SS Holcomb, and JF
McKeefry. 2005. The Wildland Urban Interface in the United States. Ecological Applications 15:799-80
2. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: We used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21
California counties that lie partially or fully within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004) and overlaid
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004)
3. Data is for Sierra Nevada portion of County. Methodology: These data were compiled using GIS to compare
CalFire’s fire threat data map (CalFire 2004) with population information from the California Department of
Finance. GreenInfo Network, 2004.
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2Appendix C: 
Maps of Fire Risk and General Plans 
in the Sierra Nevada
The following maps identify areas that are slated for rural residential development that are classified as “very 
high” or “extreme” fire threat by CalFire.
To create these maps, we used GIS data of the General Plans for all 21 California counties that lie partially or fully 
within the Sierra Nevada Region (Johnston, 2004). Our analysis only includes those portions of the counties that 
lie within the Sierra Nevada region, as defined by the Sierra Nevada Ecosystem Project study area boundary. We 
focused on lands classified as low density residential (density range 1 house per 2-20 acres) and very low density 
residential (density range 1 house per 20-80 acres).  
We then overlaid CalFire’s statewide Fire Threat map to compare areas where high, very high or extreme fire 
threat overlap with areas classified for rural residential development. This analysis does not distinguish between 
lands that are already developed and lands that are not yet developed.  Also, we did not examine other land 
classifications, such as commercial, industrial, medium-density residential and high density residential, which 
constitute a very small fraction of development in our region.  The General Plan data used for this analysis were 
compiled in 2000.
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